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Abstract:    
I   use   Plotinus   to   present   absolute   divine   simplicity   as   the   consequence   of  
principles   about   metaphysical   and   explanatory   priority   to   which   most   theists   are  
already  committed.  I  employ  Phil  Corkum’s  account  of  ontological  independence  as  
independent  status  to  present  a  new  interpretation  of  Plotinus  on  the  dependence  of  
everything  on  the  One.  On  this  reading,  if  something  else  (whether  an  internal  part  
or   something   external)   makes   you   what   you   are,   then   you   are   ontologically  
dependent  on   it.   I   show   that   this   account   supports  Plotinus’s   claim   that   any  entity  
with   parts   cannot   be   fully   independent.   In   particular,   I   lay   out   Plotinus’s   case   for  
thinking  that  even  a  divine  self-­‐‑understanding  intellect  cannot  be  fully  independent.  
I   then   argue   that   a  weaker   version   of   simplicity   is   not   enough   for   the   theist   since  
priority   monism   meets   the   conditions   of   a   moderate   version   of   ontological  
independence  just  as  well  as  a  transcendent  but  complex  ultimate  being.  
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1. Introduction  
This   paper   draws   on   the   works   of   Plotinus   to   present   absolute   divine  
simplicity   as   the   natural   consequence   of   principles   about   metaphysical   and  
explanatory   priority   to   which   the   theist   (and   the   perfect   being   theologian   in  
particular)   is   already   committed.   I   show   why   Plotinus   thinks   that   strong   divine  
simplicity  follows  from  two  principles  that  perfect-­‐‑being  theologians  feel  pressure  to  
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endorse:   1)   the   ultimate   being   is   absolutely   ontologically   independent   and   2)   the  
ultimate  being  needs  no   further   explanation   and.  Plotinus   argues   that   the  ultimate  
being   cannot   have   internal   parts.   If   the   ultimate   being   has   distinct   metaphysical  
parts,   the  whole  would   depend   on   them   in   some  way,   violating   1).   Plotinus   does  
concede   that   in  many  cases  wholes  are  ontologically  prior   to   their  parts,   insofar  as  
the  whole  explains  and  causes  the  parts,  making  them  what  they  are.  Nevertheless,  
the  status  of  any  metaphysical  whole  is  still  dependent  on  its  parts,  since  it  could  not  
be  what   it   is  without   these   parts,   something   even   advocates   of   the   priority   of   the  
whole,  such  as  Aristotle,  recognize.  This  means  that  an  absolutely  independent  being  
cannot  have  any  kind  of  internal  structure  or  parts.  Similarly,  if  the  ultimate  being’s  
attributes  were  distinct  from  each  other,  then  we  would  need  a  further  explanation  of  
why  they  are  united  in  one  being,  violating  2).  This  explanation  would  be  different  
from   these   attributes   and   would   be   prior   to   them,   explaining   their   unity   in   the  
ultimate  being.  Thus  the  supposed  ultimate  being  would  not  be  fundamental  to  the  
structure  of  reality.  
My  interpretation  also  addresses  a  central  issue  facing  Plotinus’s  position  on  
the   absolute   independence   of   the   ultimate   being.   Scholars   have   standardly  
interpreted  Plotinus  as  claiming  that  the  One  can  exist  without  anything  else,  but  not  
vice   versa.   However,   the   One   does   not   seem   to   be   counterfactually   independent,  
since  Plotinus  thinks  that  all  things  necessarily  proceed  from  it.  Drawing  on  work  by  
Phil  Corkum,  I  present  an  alternative  interpretation  of  ontological  independence  that  
avoids   this   problem.   On   this   view,   ontological   independence   requires   that   your  
metaphysical   status  be   independent  of   any  other   entity.   If   something  else   (even  an  
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internal  part)  makes  you  what  you  are,  then  you  are  ontologically  dependent  on  it  in  
that  respect.  I  argue  that  this  reading  is  the  best  way  of  articulating  Plotinus’s  views.  
First,  since  this  account  is  not  a  counterfactual  one,  it  allows  Plotinus  to  hold  that  the  
One   is   absolutely   independent   even   though   everything   necessarily   proceeds   from  
the  One.  Secondly,  I  show  that  this  account  can  be  used  to  support  Plotinus’s  claim  
that   any   entity   with   parts   cannot   be   fully   independent.   I   do   this   by   laying   out  
Plotinus’s   case   for   thinking   that   even   a   divine   self-­‐‑understanding   intellect,   the  
ultimate   being   according   to   Aristotle   and   a   number   of   Platonists,   cannot   be  
ontologically  independent.    
I  conclude  by  discussing  possible  ways  of  responding  to  Plotinus’s  argument.  
Some   may   accept   Plotinus’s   position   and   work   to   show   how   the   metaphysics  
Plotinus   offers   is   compatible   with   their   theological   views.   Others   may   opt   for   a  
weaker   version   of   independence,   which   only   requires   that   the   ultimate   being   be  
prior  to  its  parts.  In  response  to  this,  I  show  that  adopting  a  weaker  principle  creates  
difficulties   for   the   theist,   since  priority  monism  meets   the  conditions  of  a  moderate  
version   of   ontological   independence   just   as   well   as   a   transcendent   but   complex  
ultimate   being.   Finally,   attackers   of   metaphysical   theism   may   try   to   employ  
Plotinus’s  views  as  a  reductio  ad  absurdum.  Plotinus’s  argument  is  worth  considering  
both  in  itself  and  as  a  way  to  clarify  general  issues  about  ontological  and  explanatory  
priority  that  face  all  accounts  of  reality.  
2. Context  
In   contemporary   philosophy   of   religion,   the   goals   and   approach   of   perfect  
being   theology   are   often   formulated   in   Anselmian   terms   (for   example,   Nagasawa  
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2008;   Rogers   2000;   and   Morris   1987).   This   may   well   be   appropriate—Anselm’s  
formulation   is   distinctive   and   influential,   particularly   for   trying   to   harmonize  
philosophical   theology  and  divine  revelation—but  we  need   to  remember   that   there  
are  earlier  sources  worth  bringing  into  the  conversation.  As  Brian  Leftow  points  out,  
Anselm   did   not   originate   perfect   being   theology   and   is,   in   fact,   drawing   on   its  
extensive   earlier   history   (2004:   132).   Its   roots   extend   at   least   as   far   back   as  
Parmenides  and  Xenophanes  and  their  insistence  on  an  ultimate  transcendent  being  
(Xenophanes,   B23;   B24;   B25;   B26;   A12;   Parmenides,   B8;   cf.   Plato,   Parmenides   137c-­‐‑
160b).  Plotinus   is  one  of   the  most   important  ancient  exponents  of   this  perfect  being  
tradition.  He  defends  a  series  of  metaphysical  constraints  on   the  highest  being  and  
develops   a   notion   of   divine   simplicity   that   sets   the   agenda   for  much   of   perennial  
philosophical   theology.   For   example,   Plotinus   articulates   a   causal   principle   of  
predication  (VI.9,  6.54-­‐‑58)  and  insists  that  there  are  no  real  relations  between  the  One  
and   derivative   beings   (VI.8,   8)   setting   the   stage   for   medieval   discussions   of  
transcendence   and   creator/creation   relations.   His  work   influenced   a  wide   array   of  
Islamic,  Jewish,  and  Christian  theologians  drawing  on  the  Neoplatonic  tradition  (for  
discussion,   see   the   introduction  of  Adamson   2002).  Moreover,   a  pagan  perspective  
on  divine  simplicity  may  help  to  bring  to  light  assumptions  involved  in  Abrahamic  
versions  of  perfect  being  theology.    
Plotinus’s   arguments   for   divine   simplicity   are   also   worth   bringing   into  
conversation   with   contemporary   philosophy   of   religion   on   their   philosophical  
merits.   Plotinus   attacks   the   assumption   that   a   perfect   being   would   have   maximal  
versions   of   the   sort   of   personal   characteristics   that   human   beings   have.   Instead   of  
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attributing  a  variety  of  apparently  great-­‐‑making  properties  to  the  supreme  being  and  
then   trying   to   determine   the   degree   to  which   they   are   compatible,   Plotinus   insists  
that   unity   is   basic   to   the   first   being’s   role   as   the   ultimate   metaphysical   and  
explanatory   principle.   This   approach   distinguishes   him   from   the   predominant  
contemporary   approaches   and   from   some   of   his   ancient   interlocutors,   such   as   the  
Stoics   (see   Leftow   2011   for   further   discussion   of   the   ancient   and   medieval  
antecedents   to  Anselm’s  perfect  being   theology).  This  different  approach  can  avoid  
some   of   the   disputes   over   possibility   that   have   characterized   recent   evaluations   of  
omniGod  perfect  being  theology  (e.g.  Oppy  2011;  Nagasawa  2013).  
Examining  Plotinus’s   positive   arguments   for   divine   simplicity   also   helps   to  
add  an  important  dimension  to  the  current  scholarly  discussion  of  divine  simplicity.  
Recent  work  on  divine  simplicity  has  largely  focused  on  defending  divine  simplicity  
from   various   attacks   (e.g.   Stump   2013,   Brower   2008,   Jacobs   forthcoming).   Authors  
have  defended  the  coherence  of  divine  simplicity  against  objections  and  articulated  
the   extent   to   which   divine   simplicity   is   compatible   with   the   freely   loving   God   of  
Abrahamic  religion.  Not  as  much  work  has  been  done  on  the  positive  case  for  divine  
simplicity.   This   paper   articulates   the   case   for   thinking   that   absolute   simplicity   is   a  
consequence  of  ontological  independence.    
3. Absolute  Ontological  Independence  
Plotinus,   like   many   ancient   thinkers,   holds   that   there   must   be   an   ultimate  
principle  that  is  ontologically  prior  to  all  other  beings  and  explains  and  accounts  for  
all   other   beings.   Within   philosophical   theology   these   claims   are   common,   with  
versions  of  these  principles  used  from  Parmenides  to  Avicenna  and  up  to  the  present  
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day.  What  distinguishes  Plotinus  is  his  insistence  that  this  ultimate  principle  must  be  
absolutely   simple.   It   must   lack   any   internal   structure   or   dependence   relations,  
anything  that  could  differentiate  one  part  of  it  from  another.  
Virtually  all  classical  theists  ascribe  aseity—having  being  a  se,  from  itself—to  
the  ultimate  principle.  Anything  that  does  not  possess  aseity  depends,  by  definition,  
on  something  else  to  make  it  what  it  is  or  to  give  it  being.    But  such  a  thing  could  not  
be  first  or  perfect,  as  what  it  depended  on  would  be  prior  and  more  perfect.  Thus  the  
ultimate  principle  must  satisfy  aseity.  Many  theists,  however,   think  that   the  perfect  
being  only  needs  to  be   independent  of  entities  that  are  outside  of  and  fully  distinct  
from  it.  They  hold  that  differentiation  and  dependence  relations  are  possible  within  
the  ultimate  being  (I  will  consider  more  moderate  versions  of  aseity  in  sections  5  and  
8).    
This   is   the  claim  that  Plotinus  challenges.  Plotinus’s   insistence  on  a  stronger  
kind  of  unity  comes  out  clearly  in  the  first  passage  I  want  us  to  consider:  
When  you  think  of  him  as  Intellect  or  God,  he  is  more;  and  when  you  unify  
him   in   your   thought,   here   also   the  degree   of   unity   by  which  he   transcends  
your  thought  is  more  than  you  imagined  it  to  be;  for  he  is  by  himself  without  
any   incidental   attribute   (sumbebēkos).   But   someone   could   also   think   of   his  
oneness   in   terms   of   self-­‐‑sufficiency   (autarkēs).   For   since   he   is   the   most  
sufficient   and   independent,   he   must   also   be   the   most   without   need;   but  
everything  which  is  many  is  also  in  need  unless   it  becomes  one  from  many.  
Therefore   its   substance   (ousia)   needs   to   be   one.   But   the  One   does   not   need  
itself:   for   it   is   itself.   Certainly   anything   that   is   many   needs   all   the   things  
which  it  is.  And  each  of  the  things  in  it,  since  it  is  with  the  others  and  not  by  
itself,  exists  in  need  of  the  others,  making  a  thing  of  such  a  kind  needy  both  in  
each   single  part   and  as   a  whole.  Given,   then,   that   there  must  be   something  
supremely  self-­‐‑sufficient  (autarkestaton),  it  must  be  the  One,  which  is  the  only  
thing   of   such   a   kind   as   not   to   be   in   need   either   in   relation   to   itself   or   to  
anything  else.1  (Enneads  VI.9,  6.13-­‐‑30)    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Translations  of  Plotinus  are  based  on  those  of  A.  H.  Armstrong  (Plotinus,  vols.  I–VII,  
Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press,  [Loeb]  1966-­‐‑1988)  though  often  with  significant  alterations.  




In   this  passage  Plotinus  argues   that   anything  with  parts,   anything   that   is  both  one  
and  many,   cannot   be   fully   self-­‐‑sufficient   (autarkēs)   or   independent.   To   see  why   he  
thinks  this,  let  us  start  with  a  familiar  case.    
Why,   you   might   wonder,   don’t   I   count   as   the   perfect   and   ultimate   being  
(especially  if  I  am  already  tempted  to  think  about  myself  this  way)?  As  great  as  you  
are  (and  Plotinus  does,  in  fact,  think,  that  in  a  way  each  of  us  is  divine),  you  are  not  
truly   self-­‐‑sufficient.   Your   failure   to   be   perfect   may   be   over-­‐‑determined   (mine  
certainly   is),   but   the   limitation   that   Plotinus   is   interested   in   here   involves   the  
multiplicity   of   our   being.   You   are   yourself,   but   you   also   are   something   reading,  
thinking,  moving  around  etc.  You  are  both  one  and  many.  Why  is  this  problematic?  
Plotinus   claims   that,   ’anything   which   is   many   needs   all   the   things   which   it   is.’   If  
being  the  kind  of  thing  that  you  are  essentially  involves  having  multiple  parts,  then  
you   cannot   be  what   you   are  without   them.   You   are   dependent   on   your   parts   and  
they   are   dependent   on   each   other   (e.g.   your   bodily   motions   depend   on   your  
executive  direction,  your  activity  of  reading  depends  on  your  vision,  your  thoughts  
depend   on   your  memories,   and   all   your   activities   depend   on   your   having   life).   If  
your  parts  went  away,  you  would  go  away.  In  this  way,  you  are  ‘needy  both  in  each  
single  part  and  as  a  whole.’  
So,   what   kind   of   thing   could   avoid   being   needy?   Only   an   entirely   simple  
being,  Plotinus  insists,  could  be  self-­‐‑sufficient  in  this  strong  way.  As  Plotinus  put  it  
‘the  One  does  not  need  itself:  for  it  is  itself.’  If  you  just  are  what  you  are  and  nothing  
else,  you  can  be  self-­‐‑sufficient.  We  can  formulate  Plotinus’s  principle  in  the  following  
way:    
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1)  Absolute  Ontological  Independence:  the  ultimate  being  cannot,  in  any  way,  
depend  for  its  being  on  anything  distinct  from  itself.  
Plotinus  thinks  that,  upon  reflection,  we  can  see  that  this  principle  rules  out  not  just  
dependence  on  external  beings,  but  also  having  any  internal  parts,  as  these  would  be  
distinct   from   the  whole  while  helping   to  make   it  what   it   is   and  give   it   being.  This  
violates  full  ontological  independence,  as  I  will  explain  further  in  section  5.  
4. No  Further  Explanation  
The  defender  of  a  more  qualified  version  of  simplicity  might  claim  that  parts  
are   not   always   prior   to   their   wholes.   Indeed,   some   contemporary   metaphysicians  
have  argued  that  dependence  relations  go  up  to  a  whole,  not  down  to  the  parts,  so  
that,   for  example,   the  cosmos,  the  ultimate  concrete  whole,   is  a  better  candidate  for  
what   is   ontologically   fundamental   than   its   constituent   parts   (e.g.   Schaffer   2010a;  
2010b).  
Plotinus   is   well   aware   of   such   views   on   unity,   and,   indeed,   thinks   that   in  
many  cases  (including  the  perceptible  cosmos  and  embodied  living  things)  the  whole  
gives  being  to  the  parts  and  explains  them.  We  see  this  in  the  following  passage:  
[Unified  substances  have]  together  with  their  substance  (ousia)  also  the  cause  
of   their   subsisting   (hupostasis),   so   that   the   observer   afterwards   can   say  why  
each  of   its   inherent  parts   is   there,   for   instance  why  there   is  an  eye  and  why  
the  feet  of  these  particular  beings  are  as  they  are  and  the  cause  which  brings  
them   into   existence   on   account   of   each   other.  Why   are   the   legs   and   feet   as  
long  as  they  are?  Because  this  is  as  it  is,  and  because  the  face  is  as  it  is  the  feet  
and   legs   are   as   they   are.  And   in   general   the   harmony   of   all   the   parts  with  
each  other  is  their  reciprocal  cause;  and  the  reason  why  this  part  is,  is  that  this  
is  the  being  for  humanity  (to  anthrōpōi  einai);  so  that  the  being  and  the  cause  
are  one  and   the   same.  But   these  came   in   this  way   from  a   single   source   that  
did  not   reason  but  gave,   together  as  a  whole,   the   reason  why   (to  dia   ti)  and  
the  being   (to  einai).   It   is   the  source   therefore  of  being  and   the  why  of  being,  
giving  both  at  once.  (VI.8,  14.20-­‐‑30)  
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Here   Plotinus  maintains   that   in   unified   substances,   like   human   beings,   the   whole  
explains   the  order  of   the  parts.  The   form  of  human  being,  what   it   is   to  be  human,  
explains  why  Socrates’s  face  is  arranged  in  the  way  that  it   is,  why  his  thigh  bone  is  
connected  to  his  hip  bone,  and,  generally,  the  configuration  and  arrangements  of  his  
parts.   This   contrasts   with   a   mere   heap   where   there   are   a   bunch   of   things   but   no  
reason   or   explanation,   beyond   chance,   for   why   they   relate   as   they   do.   Socrates   is  
more  one  and  more  of  a  being  than  a  pile  of  flesh  and  bones  because  of  the  way  his  
form  or  soul  makes  his  parts  what  they  are  and  organizes  them  into  a  unified  whole.    
However,   Plotinus   does   not   think   that   unified   substances   are   fully  
independent   and   subsistent   beings.   While   the   parts   depend   for   their   order   and  
arrangement  on  the  whole,  the  whole  would  not  be  what  it  is  without  the  parts.  The  
whole  has  priority  over  the  parts  causally,  in  giving  the  reason  why  (to  dia  ti)  things  
are  as  they  are.  However,  the  whole  and  its  parts  are  reciprocally  dependent  on  each  
other  when   it   comes   to   their   being   (to   einai),   as   I   discuss   in   the   next   section.  Also,  
Plotinus   insists   that   they   are   ‘of   this   kind   [sc.   unified   substances]   by   what   comes  
from  those  higher  beings.’   (VI.8,  14.19-­‐‑20)  Although   the  human   form  explains  a   lot  
about  Socrates,  Plotinus  thinks  it  also  stands  in  need  of  further  explanation.  Why  are  
there   human   beings   at   all?   The   human   form   in   Socrates   does   not   answer   this  
question   on   its   own.   Just   considering  what   is   to   be   human   does   not   explain  why  
there  are  human  beings.  We  need  a  further  account  that  depends  on  a  further  entity.    
This  relates  to  a  more  general  claim  that  Plotinus  makes:  as  we  ascend  away  
from  changeable  being   and   towards   things   that   truly   subsist,  we  move  away   from  
the  range  of   the  arbitrary:   ‘as  one  goes  towards  the  simple   it   is  not  possible  to  take  
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chance  up  with  one,   so   that   it   is   impossible   for  chance   to  ascend   to   the  simplest  of  
all.’  (VI.8,  14.15-­‐‑17)  Higher  and  more  unified  principles  are  not  affected  by  chance  or  
in  need  of  further  explanation.  Indeed,  as  we  saw  in  the  earlier  quote,  higher  levels  of  
being  give   lower  ones,  not   just   their   ‘being  (to  einai),’  but  also   their   ‘reason  why  (to  
dia  ti).’  The  ultimate  principle,  from  this  perspective,  is  seen  not  just  as  the  source  of  
all  being  but  also  as  what  needs  no  explanation,  the  unexplained  explainer.  Plotinus  
lays  this  out  emphatically  at  the  end  of  the  chapter  I  have  been  quoting  from:  
If   then  there  is  nothing  random  or  by  chance  and  no  ‘it  happened  to  be  like  
this’   with   the   things   which   have   their   cause   in   themselves,   and   all   things  
which   come   from  him  do  have   it,   for  he   is   the   father  of   account   (logos)   and  
cause   (aitia)   and   causal   substance   (aitiōdēs   ousia),  which   are   certainly   all   far  
from   chance,   he   would   be   the   principle   and   in   a   way   the   exemplar   of   all  
things  which  have  no  part  in  chance,  truly  and  primarily,  uncontaminated  by  
chances  and  coincidence  and  happening,   cause  of  himself   and  himself   from  
himself   and   though   himself;   for   his   is   primarily   self   (prōtos   autos)   and   self  
beyond  being  (huperontōs  autos).  (VI.8,  14.35-­‐‑42)  
  
This  gives  us  a  second  principle  that  Plotinus  thinks  the  ultimate  being  must  satisfy:  
2)  No  Further  Explanation:  what  a  perfect  being  is  cannot  be  in  need  of  any  
explanation.  
The  ultimate  being  explains  the  being  of  everything  else.  If  a  purported  perfect  being  
needs  something  further  to  explain  why  it  has  the  attributes  and  being  that  it  has,  it  
cannot  be  the  highest  being.  It  cannot  depend  on  something  to  account  for  the  way  it  
is,  since  it  accounts  for  the  way  all  other  beings  are.  
5. What  Does  Ontological  Priority  Involve?  
As  we  just  saw,  Plotinus,  in  line  with  Aristotle,  maintains  that  in  many  cases  
the  whole   explains   the   parts   by  making   them  what   they   are.   Gregory   Fowler   has  
recently  used  this  notion  of  the  priority  of  the  whole  to  formulate  what  he  calls:    
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The  Doctrine  of  Divine  Priority  (DDP):  For  all  x,  if  x  is  a  proper  part  of  God  
or  x   is   a   property   of  God,   then  x   depends   on  God   for   its   existence   (Fowler  
2015)    
Fowler   presents   this   as   an   alternative   to   divine   simplicity.   If   the   whole   can   be  
ontologically   prior   to   its   parts,   then   theists   can   preserve   aseity  without   endorsing  
absolute   simplicity.   So,   why   does   Plotinus   insist   that   wholes   cannot   be   truly  
independent  of  their  parts?  
To   understand   this,   we   need   to   consider   the   notion   of   ontological   priority  
operative  here.  Aristotle,  whom  both  Plotinus  and  Fowler  are  drawing  on,  describes  
the  notion  of  ontological  dependence  when  discussing  priority  in  nature.  He  says:    
As  many  as  are  able  to  be  (einai)  without  others,  although  those  others  are  not  
able   to  be   (einai)  without   them,   (which   is   the  division   that  Plato  used)   these  
things  are  said   to  be  prior   in  nature  and   in  substance   (ousia).   (Metaphysics  Δ  
11,  1019a1-­‐‑4,  my  translation)  
  
Given  Aristotle’s  reference  to  his  predecessor,  Jonathan  Beere  has  called  this  Plato’s  
criterion.  It  captures  the  sense  of  ontological  priority  to  which  Aristotle  and  Plotinus  
subscribe.  We  can  formulate  Plato’s  criterion  as  follows:  
x  is  prior  to  y  in  being  if  and  only  if,  if  x  were  not,  y  would  not  be,  but  not  vice  
versa.   (Metaphysics  Δ   11,   1019a1-­‐‑4,   as   formulated   in   Beere   2009:   ch.   13.3;   cf.  
Metaphysics  M  2,  1076a36-­‐‑b4;  Categories  12,  14a29-­‐‑35)  
We  have  already  seen  Plotinus  implicitly  appeal  to  this  criterion,  both  in  establishing  
the  independence  of  the  One  and  the  dependence  of  anything  with  parts.    
How  does   this   criterion   relate   to   the  Aristotelian   idea   of   the   priority   of   the  
whole?  Immediately  after  Aristotle  introduces  this  notion,  he  notes  that,  since  being  
is  said  in  many  ways,  things  can  be  prior  to  others  in  one  respect  but  not  in  another.  
Why  the  One  Cannot  Have  Parts            
  
12  
There   can  be   relations  of   ontological  dependence   in  both  directions,   as   long   as   the  
kinds  of  dependence   involved  are  distinct.  Aristotle  uses   the   example  of  parts   and  
wholes:  
Some   things   are   prior   in   potentiality   (dunamis),   and   others   in   actuality  
(entelecheia);  for  example,  half  a  line  [is  prior]  in  potentiality  to  the  entire  line,  
and   the   part   [is   prior   in   potentiality]   to   the   whole,   and  matter   [is   prior   in  
potentiality]  to  substance  (ousia).  But  in  actuality  they  are  posterior:  for  when  
the   whole   has   been   dissolved   they   will   be   in   actuality.   (Metaphysics  Δ   11,  
1019a7-­‐‑11,  my  translation)  
  
For  Aristotle,  the  half-­‐‑line  is  prior  in  potentiality  because  the  whole  line  would  not  be  
what   it   is   without   the   half-­‐‑line.   In   general,   the   whole’s   potential   to   be   what   it   is  
depends  on  its  parts.  However,  the  whole  is  fully  actual,  whereas  the  half-­‐‑line  does  
not   exist   as   a  half-­‐‑line   unless   and  until   the  whole   is  divided   into   a  half-­‐‑line.   In   this  
respect,  the  part’s  being  is  potential  and  subsequent  to  the  being  of  the  whole.    
For   our   purposes,  we   do   not   need   to   fully   evaluate   or   explicate  Aristotle’s  
views.   The   important   thing   to   note   is   that   even  Aristotle,  who   thinks   that   unified  
wholes  are,  in  the  most  important  sense,  ontologically  prior  to  their  parts,  also  holds  
that   there   is   another   respect   in   which   they   are   ontologically   posterior   to   and  
dependent  on  these  parts.  Indeed,  Aristotle  even  seems  to  hold  in  Metaphysics  Ζ  10-­‐‑
11  that  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  whole  is  dependent  on  its  definitional  parts  (for  
discussion  see  Burnyeat  2001;  Frede  and  Patzig  1988).  
Thus   the   priority   of   the   whole   is   not   enough   to   establish   full   ontological  
independence.  Fowler  appeals  to  Aristotle’s  metaphysics  as  a  model  for  ontological  
priority  (2015:  13-­‐‑17).  But  if  the  parts  provide  the  matter  or  potentiality  for  the  whole,  
they   seem   to   be   prior   to   it   in   this   respect,   violating   1)   Absolute   Ontological  
Independence.   This   is   one   of   the   reasons   Aristotle   insists   that   his   own   ultimate  
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principle   is   not   a   whole   composed   of   parts   or   the   actuality   of   some   potentiality  
(Metaphysics    Θ  8,  1050b7-­‐‑28;  Λ  7  and  9).    
Thus   even   though   Plotinus   concedes   that   the   functional   status   of   parts   as  
parts  depends  on  the  whole,  he  is  still  entitled  to  insist  that  wholes  which  depend  on  
their  parts  fail  to  meet  1),  since  they  are  ontological  dependent  on  their  parts  in  some  
way.   The   priority   of   the   whole   is   not   enough   to   satisfy   1)   Absolute   Ontological  
Independence.   To   show   that   divine   priority   is   compatible   with   aseity,   you   would  
need  to  show  that  there  is  no  way  in  which  a  whole  is  dependent  on  its  parts,  not  just  
that  there  is  some  way  in  which  the  parts  are  dependent  on  whole.  
6. Can  the  One  be  Absolutely  Independent?  
But   can   anything,   including   the   ultimate   principle   Plotinus   posits,   actually  
satisfy   Plato’s   Criterion   and   meet   Absolute   Ontological   Independence?   Here   a  
problem  arises  from  Plotinus’s  views  on  the  way  that  things  proceed  from  the  One.  
To  explain  this  process,  Plotinus  uses  the  illustration  of  a  number  series,  in  which  we  
conceive  of  all   the  other  numbers  as  coming  from  and  being  generated  from  1:     we  
put  1   together  with   itself  and  get  2,  we  put  1   together  with  2  and  get  3,  and  so  on  
(V.5,  4.20-­‐‑5).  On  this  picture,  1  can  exist  on  its  own  and  just  is  what  it  is,  but  all  the  
other  numbers  depend  for  their  existence  on  1  (since  they  are  generated  from  it)  and  
also  explanatorily  depend  on  1   (since  what   they  are   is  defined  with  reference  to  1).  
This  is  an  analogy  of  the  way  that  everything  else  relates  to  the  One,  not  by  temporal  
dependence  but  by  explanatory  and  ontological  dependence.  When  we  ask  about  the  
being  of  anything  else,  it  will  turn  out  to  be  accounted  for  by  the  One.    
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The  One,   by   contrast,   does   not   have   any   relation   to   anything   else.  Nothing  
else  in  reality  could  modify  or  affect  the  One:  it  always  is  what  it  is.  This  is  the  only  
way,   Plotinus   thinks,   that   Absolute   Ontological   Independence   and   No   Further  
Explanation  can  be  satisfied.  As  Dominic  O’Meara  puts  it:    
Plotinus'ʹs   conception   of   Platonic   priority   by   nature…refers   to   a   relation   of  
nonreciprocal   dependence   in   which,   in   a   series   of   terms,   the   posterior  
depends  on   the  prior   and   cannot   exist  without   the  prior,  whereas   the  prior  
exists   independently   of   the   posterior   and   is   not   destroyed   with   the  
destruction  of  the  posterior.  (1996:  72)  
  
So,  on  O’Meara’s   reading,   the  One  can  exist  without   the   things   that  come  from  the  
One  but  not  vice  versa.    
But,  for  Plotinus,  everything  proceeds  from  the  One,  as  all  numbers  proceed  
from  1.  John  Bussanich  points  out  this  problem,  noting  that  Plotinus’s  claims  ‘imply  
that   the   One'ʹs   giving   cannot   not   have   occurred   and   cannot   cease.’   (1996:   49-­‐‑50)  
Necessary   emanation   is   a   central   feature   of   Plotinus’s   metaphysical   system.   In  
particular,   the   other   Hypostases   or   substantial   beings,   the   Intellect   and   the   Soul,  
come   from   the   One.   But   this   seems   to   make   the   three   hypotheses   reciprocally  
entailing   and   thus  mutually   dependent   for   existence,   contrary   to  Plato’s  Criterion  
and  1)  Absolute  Ontological  Independence.  On  the  standard  interpretation  of  Plato’s  
Criterion,   it   is  only  when  the  existence  of  B   implies  A,  but  not  vice  versa,   that  A  is  
ontologically   prior   to   B.   So   it   now   seems   like   even   the   One   is   counterfactually  
dependent  on  something.2  
The   best   way   to   solve   this   problem   is   by   reconsidering   how   to   interpret  
Plato’s  Criterion  and  1).  Many  scholars  have  understood  these  conditions  in  terms  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  I  would  like  to  thank  Timothy  Pawl  for  forcefully  raising  this  objection.	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existence  implications  and  counterfactual  dependence.  For  example,  Jonathan  Beere  
describes  Plato’s  Criterion   as   requiring   ‘non-­‐‑reciprocal   entailment  of   being.’   (2009:  
294)  Similarly,  Dominic  O’Meara  takes  the  criterion  Plotinus  is  using  to  require  that  
‘for  A   to   be,   there   must   be   B,   but   not   vice   versa;   the   destruction   of   B  means   the  
destruction  of  A,  but  not  vice  versa.’  (1996:  69)  But  counterfactual  dependence  is  not  
the  only  way  to  interpret  1).  Phil  Corkum  has  proposed  an  alternative  interpretation  
of  ontological  priority  or  separability,  a  grounding  reading.  On  his  interpretation,  A  
is   ontologically   independent   from   B   if   A   has   the   ontological   status   of   a   being  
independently  of  standing  in  some  tie  to  B  (Corkum  2008).  The  idea  is  that  A  is  what  
it  is  apart  from  any  contribution  B  makes,  while  B  only  is  what  it  is  because  of  A.  We  
can   offer   a   general   formulation   of   the   grounding   reading   of   Plato’s   Criterion   as  
follows:    
x  is  prior  to  y  in  being  if  and  only  if,  if  x  were  not  what  it  is  or  did  not  have  
the  ontological  status  it  does,  y  would  not  be  what  it  is  or  have  the  ontological  
status  it  does,  but  not  vice  versa.  (cf.  Corkum  2013)  
  
This  view  of  ontological  dependence  allows  us   to   see  why  Plotinus   thinks   that   the  
One  can  be  both  the  necessary  source  of  everything  else  and  absolutely  independent  
of  all  beings.    
For  Plotinus,  the  One  has  its  status  apart  from  anything  else.  As  we  have  seen  
in  our  passages,  even  if  other  things  come  from  the  One,   it   is  what  it   is  on  its  own,  
without  reference  to  any  other  object  or  any  internal  feature  or  property.  By  contrast,  
everything  else  is  what  it  is  because  of  its  relation  to  the  One.  As  I  mentioned  above,  
Plotinus  holds  that  the  other  hypostases,  the  Intellect  and  Soul,  necessarily  emanate  
from   the   One   (e.g.   V.1;   V.2;   V.5).   Thus   their   status   as   being   what   they   are   is  
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dependent  on  the  One,  but  not  vice  versa.  It  is  part  of  what  Intellect  is  that  it  comes  
from   the   One.   Similarly,   Soul   is   what   it   is   because   of   the   way   it   comes   from   the  
Intellect  and  the  One.  Even  though  the  three  hypostases  are  mutually  entailing,   the  
One  grounds  the  others.    
Now,   an   objector   might   still   question   this   claim   of   independence.   For  
Plotinus,  we   posit   the  One   as   the   ultimate   cause   of   unity,   being,   and   goodness   in  
everything  we  perceive   and  know.   If  we  merely   call   this   thing  Good  or   absolutely  
simple  without  being  aware  of   it  as  a  source  and  origin,  Plotinus  says   that  we  will  
not  really  connect  with  it  (III.8,  9.15-­‐‑19).  But  if  we  can  only  think  about  or  have  access  
to   the  One  via   its  causal  agency,   its  causal  agency  would  seem  to  be  essential   to   it.  
The  One  would  not  be   the  One  without   the  effects   to  which   it  gives  rise,  since   it   is  
essentially  a  ‘productive  power  of  all  things.’3  (III.8,  10.1)    
Plotinus   has   strong   grounds   for   resisting   this   objection.   Even   if   we   only  
cognize   the  One   insofar  as   it   is   a   certain  kind  of   cause,  our   epistemic  access   to   the  
One  does  not  determine  its  ontological  status.  We  may  only  have  epistemic  access  to  
distant  stars  through  observing  the  light  they  emanate,  but  that  does  not  mean  that  
what  those  stars  are  is  defined  by  their  emanation.  For  Plotinus,  we  can  come  to  see  
that  the  One’s  status  must  be  completely  independent  of  all  beings,  even  if  we  access  
the  One  through  effects  emanated  from  it.  As  he  emphatically  puts  it:  
But  we  must  say  that  [the  One]  is  entirely  unrelated  to  anything;  for  it  is  what  
it   is   (esti   hoper   esti)   before   them;   for  we   take   away   the   ‘is’,   and   so   also   any  
relation  to  things  that  are  in  any  way.  (VI.8,  8.14-­‐‑16)  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  I  would  like  to  thank  one  of  my  anonymous  referees  for  helpfully  raising  
this  objection.	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All  beings  relate  to  the  One,  but  the  One  just  is  what  it  is,  with  no  intrinsic  relations  
to   anything   outside   itself.   It   perfectly   satisfies   1).   Thus   Corkum’s   notion   of  
metaphysical  status  is  a  helpful  way  of  explicating  Plotinus’s  use  of  Plato’s  Criterion  
and  1).   It  explains  why  the  One  meets   these  conditions,  but  unified  wholes  do  not,  
since  their  status  is  still  dependent  on  their  parts,  a  point  we  will  examine  more  fully  
in  section  9.  
7. How  We  Can  Connect  to  that  which  is  “Beyond  Being.”  
Even   if  Plotinus’s  application  of  Plato’s  Criterion   is   consistent  and   the  One  
satisfies  1),   some  of  Plotinus’s   statements   concerning   the  ultimate  being  might   still  
make  you  worry  that  his  view  is  incomprehensible:  
For  there  must  be  something  simple  (haploun)  before  (pro)  all  things,  and  this  
must  be  other   than  all   the   things  which   come  after   it,   existing  by   itself,   not  
mixed   with   the   things   which   derive   from   it,   and   all   the   same   able   to   be  
present   in  a  different  way   to   these  other   things,  being   really  one,  and  not  a  
different   being   and   then   one;   it   is   false   even   to   say   of   it   that   it   is   one,   and  
there  is  ‘no  account  (logos)  or  scientific  knowledge  (epistēmē)’  of  it;  it  is  indeed  
also   said   to   be   ‘beyond  being   (epekeina   ousias).’   For   if   it   is   not   to   be   simple,  
outside   all   coincidence   and   composition,   it   could   not   be   a   principle   (archē);  
and   it   is   the  most   self-­‐‑sufficient   (autarkestaton),   because   it   is   simple   and   the  
first   of   all:   for   that  which   is   not   the   first   needs   that  which   is   before   it,   and  
what  is  not  simple  is  in  need  of  its  simple  components  (tōn  haplōn)  so  that  it  
can  come  into  being  from  them.  (V.4.1.5-­‐‑15)  
  
Here  Plotinus  makes  two  interrelated  claims  about  the  One.  First,  it  is  the  principle  of  
everything   else:   its   presence   is   what   gives   other   things   being.   Secondly,   it   exists  
entirely   on   its   own,   unrelated   to   anything   else.   You   might   be   concerned   that  
Plotinus’s   view   is   simply   incoherent.   It   might   seem   that   his   principles   require  
impossible   things  of   the  supposed  ultimate   (e.g.   that   it   is   ‘beyond  being’)  or,  at   the  
least,   prevent   us   from   being   able   to   connect   to   this   being   (given   that   there   is   ‘no  
account  or  scientific  knowledge  of  it’).  I  want  to  clarify  some  of  the  claims  he  makes  
Why  the  One  Cannot  Have  Parts            
  
18  
about   the   One   to   avoid   misconceptions,   address   concerns   about   incoherence   or  
inconsistency,  and  give  us  a  better  sense  of  what  Plotinus  is  saying.  
While   Plotinus   consistently   maintains   that   we   cannot,   properly   speaking,  
have  an  account  (logos)  or  scientific  knowledge  (epistēmē)  of  the  One  (his  reference  is  
to  the  discussion  in  Plato’s  Parmenides,  142a3-­‐‑4),  he  insists  that  there  are  still  ways  to  
make  reference  to   it  and  connect   to   it.  Plotinus  distinguishes  between  being  able   to  
say  what  it   is,  or  knowing  its  essence,  which  is  impossible  for  us,  and  being  able  to  
speak  about  it,  which  is  possible:  ‘[the  One]  is  not  its  name,  but  says  that  it  is  not  one  
of  all  things  and  “has  no  name”  because  we  can  say  nothing  of  it:  we  only  try,  as  far  
as  possible,  to  make  signs  to  ourselves  about  it.’  (V.3,  13.4-­‐‑7)  As  I  read  him,  Plotinus  
claims   that  we   cannot   know   or   articulate   the   essence   of   the   One,   but  we   can   still  
signify  it  and  refer  to  it:    
But  we  have  [the  One]  in  such  a  way  that  we  speak  about  it,  but  do  not  speak  
it.  For  we  say  what   it   is  not,  but  we  do  not  say  what   it   is:   so   that  we  speak  
about   it   from  what  comes  after   it.  But  we  are  not  prevented   from  having   it,  
even  if  we  do  not  speak  it.  (V.3,  14.5-­‐‑8)  
  
In   place   of   intellectual   knowledge   of   the  One,   Plotinus   holds   that  we   can   have   an  
immediate  experiential  connection  with  the  One  in  which  we  identify  with  it:    
Our  awareness  of  that  One  is  not  by  way  of  scientific  knowledge  (epistēmē)  or  
of   understanding   (noēsis),   as  with   other   intelligible   things,   but   by  way   of   a  
presence  superior  to  scientific  knowledge.  (VI.9,  4.1-­‐‑4)    
  
We  can  connect  with  the  One  because  the  One  is  with  us  and  in  us,  in  a  way  that  is  
much  more  real  than  if  the  One  were  an  object  of  our  intellectual  knowledge.    These  
aspects  of  his  view  raise  many  further  questions,  but  I  hope  that  this  brief  explication  
of   his   approach   will   allay   some   concerns,   and   position   us   to   further   consider   his  
views  on  the  ontological  status  of  the  ultimate  being.  
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Now,   what   does   Plotinus   mean   in   saying   that   the   One   is   ‘beyond   being  
(epekeina   ousias),’   a   striking   phrase   taken   from   Plato’s   Republic,   509b9,   where   it   is  
applied   to   the   Form   of   the   Good?   Scholars   debate   how   to   understand   Plotinus’s  
repeated  denials  of  being   (einai)   and   substance   (ousia)   to   the  one   (e.g.  VI.8,   9.29-­‐‑30,  
III.8,   10.26-­‐‑35).   Is   Plotinus   denying   all   existence   to   the   One   or   just   conditioned  
existence?  I  will  present  my  reading  and  show  how  it  allows  Plotinus’s  view  of  the  
One   to   be   coherent.   While   this   interpretation   is   cogent   and   has   strong   scholarly  
support,  the  scope  of  this  paper  does  not  allow  me  to  fully  defend  it  against  its  rivals.  
Nevertheless,   since   my   aim   is   bringing   Plotinus’s   thought   into   dialogue   with  
contemporary  perfect  being  theology,  not  settling  this  dispute,  providing  a  plausible  
and  consistent  interpretation  of  the  One’s  simplicity  is  sufficient  for  my  purposes.    
On  my  reading,  Plotinus  is  not  denying  that  the  One  exists  (after  all,  if  it  did  
not  exist  nothing  else  would)  or  claiming  that  it  is  a  blank  nothingness,  instead  it  is  
‘Good   in   another  way  beyond   all   goods.’   (VI.9   6.58-­‐‑9)   Plotinus   is   denying   that   the  
One  has  the  sort  of  metaphysical  structure  that  all  beings  or  substances  (ousiai)  have    
(Kahn  2004:  386  and  Gerson  1994:  6  both  offer  interpretations  along  similar  lines).  In  
my   view,   Plotinus’s   claim   draws   on   a   way   of   thinking   about   being   that   is  
characteristic  of  ancient  Greek  philosophy.  For  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  Plotinus,  to  be  is  
always  to  be  something  or  other  (cf.  Owen  1965;  Brown  1994;  Kahn  2004).  For  them,  
there  is  no  universal  quantifier  that  ranges  over  every  being  that  exists.  Instead,  their  
ontologies  are  based  on  multiple  ways  of  being.  Claims  about  being  are  not  seen  as  
expressing  an  absolute  binary  (either  something  is  or  is  not,  with  no  in-­‐‑between),  but  
as  relative  to  a  way  of  being  (e.g.  these  philosophers  are  happy  to  say  both  “Socrates  
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is,”   insofar   as   he   is   a   human   being,   and   “Socrates   is   not,”   insofar   as   he   is   not,   for  
example,  a  color  or  a  god  or  a  form).  
Some   philosophers   are   rather   unsympathetic   to   this   approach.   J.S.   Mill  
accused   the   Greeks   of   confusing   the   ‘is’   of   existence   with   the   ‘is’   of   predication,  
creating   a   fog   that   ‘diffused   itself   at   an   early   period   over   the   whole   surface   of  
metaphysics.’   (1843:  104)  The  analytical   logical   framework   that  Mill,  Gottlob  Frege,  
and   others   developed   entirely   divorced   existence   claims   from   predication   claims.  
While   this   approach   is   still   employed   by  many,  most   philosophers   now   recognize  
that   this   framework   is   itself   a   contested  way   of   thinking   about   the  world  with   its  
own  metaphysical   and   semantic   commitments,   not   some   irrefutable   clarification  of  
earlier  mistakes.  Given  the  view  of  reality  that  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  Plotinus  endorse,  
they   have   philosophical   reasons   for   presenting   being   as   ways   of   being   and   for  
thinking   that   there   are   mutual   entailment   relations   between   being   and   being  
something.  Given  my  purposes,  I  will  proceed  with  elucidating  Plotinus’s  framework,  
while   recognizing   that   the  proper   semantics  of   being   is   a   contested   issue   that  may  
seriously   impact   how   one   thinks   about   the   ultimate   being   and   does   philosophical  
theology.    
Lesley   Brown   has   shown   that   while   Greeks   marked   a   syntactic   distinction  
between   complete   uses   of   einai   where   no   expressed   predicate   is   employed   (e.g.  
Socrates   is,   Socratēs   esti)   and   incomplete   uses   that   involve   a   completing   predicate  
(e.g.   white   is   a   color,   leukon   chroma   esti)   this   did   not   reflect   a   semantic   distinction  
between   two   different  meanings   or   uses.   Even   syntactically   complete   uses   of   einai  
involve  some  implicitly  predicated  way  of  being  and  can  be  supplemented:  we  can  
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ask  ‘Socrates  is  what?  (ti  esti  Socratēs?)’  In  English,  by  contrast,  ‘to  exist’  is  used  in  a  
complete   way   and   cannot   be   supplemented   with   a   predicate   (e.g.   if   I   say   ‘John  
exists,’   you   cannot   follow   up   by   asking   ‘John   exists   what?’).   Brown   helpfully  
compares   the   relationship   between   complete   and   incomplete   uses   of   einai   to   the  
relationship  between  complete  and   incomplete  uses   (in  English,  ancient  Greek,  and  
other  languages)  of  verbs  such  as  ‘teach’  and  ‘eat:’  
One  can  say  ‘Jane  teaches’  or  ‘John  is  eating’  as  well  as  ‘Jane  teaches  French’  
or   ‘John   is   eating   grapes.’   The   former,   complete   uses   are   related   to   the  
incomplete   in   the   following   ways:   ‘John   is   eating   grapes’   entails   “John   is  
eating,’  which   in   turn   is   equivalent   to   ‘John   is   eating   something.’  One  who  
hears  ‘John  is  eating’  can  properly  ask  ‘eating  what?’  (Brown  1994:  225)  
  
When  we  apply  this  to  being,  it  is  only  true  that  Socrates  is  if  Socrates  is  something,  if  
he  has  some  distinctive  way  of  being,  some  form  or  characteristics  that  he  displays.  
This  mutual  entailment  between  being  and  being  something  is  what   leads  Plotinus  to  
say  that  the  One  is  beyond  being.    
Given  Plotinus’s  metaphysics   and   semantics,   if  we   claimed   that   the  One   is,  
we  would  implicitly  be  committing  ourselves  to  claiming  that  the  One  is  something.  
Such  a  claim,  however,  would  imply  that  the  One  has  parts,  that  it  and  what  it  is  are  
distinct   from   each   other.   This   would   violate   1)   insofar   as   the   One   would   now   be  
dependent  on   its   essential  parts.   It  would  also  violate  2)   insofar   as  we  would  now  
need  an  account  for  why  these  essential  parts  are  united  in  the  One  and  why  the  One  
has  being.  On  my  interpretation,  such  considerations  are  also  what  lead  Plotinus  to  
describe   the   One   as   amorphon,   formless   (see   VI.7.17.17,   40,   33.4;   VI.9.3.39),   and  
apeiron,   unlimited   or   infinite   (see   V.   5.10.18-­‐‑22).   (cf.   Bussanich   1996:   42-­‐‑45)   These  
negative  predications  reinforce  Plotinus’s  insistence  that  the  One  is  just  what  it  is.  It  
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is  not  limited  or  defined  by  a  particular  form  or  characteristic  (cf.  Gerson  1994:  6).  My  
interpretation  explains  why  Plotinus  would  make  the  claims  he  does  and  how  they  
fit  into  his  overall  view  of  absolute  simplicity.  
8. Can  the  Theist  Qualify  Plotinus’s  Principles?  
In  response  to  Plotinus,  the  moderate  perfect  being  theologian  might  look  for  
a   revised   version   of   ontological   dependence.   Perhaps   internal   relations   of  
explanation   or   of   ontological   dependence   need   not   violate   the   principles   when  
properly   formulated,   as   Fowler’s  DDP   attempts   to   do.   Instead   of  1),   the  moderate  
perfect  theologian  could  employ  one  of  the  following:    
External  Ontological   Independence:   the   ultimate   being   cannot,   in   any  way,  
depend  for  its  being  on  anything  outside  of  itself.  
Priority   Ontological   Independence:   the   ultimate   being   cannot,   in   the   most  
fundamental  way,  depend  for  its  being  on  anything  distinct  from  itself.  
  
What   prevents   the   perfect   being   theologian   from   employing   one   of   these   weaker  
principles?  
Here  the  metaphysical  context  is  important.  The  theist  typically  insists  that  if  
the  universe  is  the  sort  of  thing  that  is  contingent,  that  could  be  or  not  be,  then  it  is  
the   sort   of   thing   that   needs   further   ontological   grounding   (cf.   Pruss   2006:   part   1;  
Pearce  forthcoming).  Similarly,  if  the  existence  and  being  of  the  universe  is  the  sort  of  
thing   that   could  be   explained,   then  we  need   to  posit   some   further  principle  which  
explains   it,  without   itself   being   in   need   of   explanation.   If   theists  want   to   use   such  
reasoning  when  addressing  metaphysical  opponents,  Plotinus   insists   that   they  also  
apply   this   reasoning   to   any   supposed   differentiation   within   the   divine   being.   If  
God’s  parts  are  distinct  from  God  we  can  ask  for  a  further  explanation  for  why  God  
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is  and  has  these  parts.  If  the  theist  simply  posits  this  as  a  brute  fact,  she  cannot  then  
object   to   the   naturalist   or   pantheist   who   posits   the   existence   of   the   contingent  
universe  as  a  brute  fact.    
For   example,   Thomas  Morris   insists   that   God,   as   the   creator   of   everything  
creatable,  creates  his  own  haecceity  or  nature  (making  the  nature  causally  dependent  
on   God)   but   also   that   God’s   haecceity   is   logically   sufficient   for   God’s   existence  
(making  God  logically  dependent  on  his  nature).  Morris  recognizes  that  this  suggests  
that  God  is  creating  himself  and  attempts  to  avoid  this  by  insisting  that  while  each  of  
these   relations   is   always   transitive,   transitivity   may   not   hold   across   both   of   them  
together  (1987:  176).  But  in  introducing  such  dependence  while  claiming  that  it  is  not  
circular   and   needs   no   further   explanation   or   grounding,   he   seems   vulnerable   to   a  
parity  argument  on  behalf  of  the  pantheist  or  cosmic  naturalist.      
The  moderate  theist  cannot  differentiate  her  view  by  claiming  that  God  only  
has  relations  of  ontological  and  explanatory  dependence  with  God’s  parts,  not  with  
anything   else.   On   the   pantheist   view   (and   some   naturalist   views),   everything   that  
exists   is   a   part   of   the   cosmos,  meaning   that   the   cosmos   too,   only   has   relations   of  
ontological   and   explanatory   dependence   with   its   parts   and   not   with   anything  
external  (see  Schaffer  2010a  and  2010b).  As  we  saw  in  section  5,  a  unified  whole,  such  
as  the  pantheist  or  the  priority  monist  cosmos,  could  have  ontological  priority  over  
all  of  its  parts  in  the  same  way  that  the  moderate  philosophical  theologian’s  complex  
divine   being   has   priority   over   its   parts.   Both   equally   satisfy   External  Ontological  
Independence  and  Priority  Ontological  Independence.   If   the  moderate  philosophical  
theologian  notes   that   the  cosmos   fails   to  meet  Plato’s  Criterion  with   respect   to   the  
Why  the  One  Cannot  Have  Parts            
  
24  
things  within  it,  the  pantheist  or  priority  monist  can  insist  that  this  simply  parallels  
the  complex  divine  being’s  failure  to  meet  Plato’s  Criterion  with  respect  to  its  parts.  
Both  wholes   can   claim   to  make   the   parts  what   they   are,  while   also   depending   on  
these  parts  for  their  continued  persistence.    
The   burden   of   proof   is   on   the   moderate   perfect   being   theologian.   The  
advocate   of   weakened   versions   of   1)   and   2)   needs   to   provide   a   version   of   these  
principles   that   rules   out  monism   and   pantheism,   requiring   an   ultimate   being   that  
transcends  the  universe,  while  still  allowing  for  this  being  to  have  constituent  parts.  
Fowler’s  DDP  explicitly  holds  that  God  has  the  same  sort  of  priority  over  his  parts  
that  the  priority  monist’s  cosmos  possesses  with  respect  to  its  parts.  Whatever  degree  
of  ontological  independence  this  provides,  it  does  not  give  theism  any  explanatory  or  
ontological  advantage.  By  contrast,  Plotinus’s  view,  on  which  the  ultimate  principle  
is  entirely  simple  and  self-­‐‑sufficient,  claims  to  fully  meet  1)  and  2)  making  it  superior  
to  its  naturalist,  monist,  and  moderate  theist  rivals.  
9. A  Case  Study:  Why  Nous  is  Too  Complex  
To  further  appreciate  how  forceful  Plotinus’s  principles  are,  I  want  to  look  at  
why  Plotinus  thinks  they  rule  out  even  minimal  differentiation  between  the  ultimate  
being  and   the  ultimate  being’s   activity  or   the  perfect   being  and   the  perfect   being’s  
nature.  To  do  this,  I  want  to  consider  the  case  study  of  nous  (intellect)  and  its  activity  
of  noēsis  (understanding).  In  several  of  his  treatises,  Plotinus  argues  against  properly  
attributing   this   intellectual   activity   to   the   ultimate   principle.   These   arguments   are  
important  within   Plotinus’s   own  metaphysics,   as   they   help   him   to   distinguish   the  
One,   the   first   and  primal  hypostasis,   from   Intellect  or  Nous,   the   second  hypostasis,  
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which  generates  the  world  of  forms  by  understanding  itself.  They  are  also  important  
in   the   dialectical   context.   Aristotle   thought   that   the   ultimate   principle   was  Nous,  
which   he   argues   is   the   same   as   the   activity   of   self-­‐‑understanding   (Metaphysics  Λ  7  
and   9).   Later   Peripatetics   such   as   Alexander   of   Aphrodisias   follow   Aristotle.  
Moreover,  several  of   the  middle  Platonists  before  Plotinus  seem  to  have  thought  of  
nous   as   the   highest   principle   (E.g.  Numenius,   fr.   20.12).  A   number   of   early   Jewish  
and  Christian  thinkers  also  described  God  as  nous  or  logos  (e.g.  Origen,  De  Principiis  
1.6-­‐‑7).  Augustine  will  use  the  model  of  nous  as  self-­‐‑understanding  to  think  about  the  
relationship  between  the  first  person  of  the  Trinity  and  the  Word,  the  second  person  
of   the   Trinity,   an   approach   that   will   become   predominant   within   Western  
Christianity  (e.g  De  Trin.  VII.2,  XIV  2-­‐‑4).  
Seeing  why  Plotinus  thinks  that  nous  or  intellect  cannot  be  the  first  principle  
of  things  will  help  us  to  see  why  he  insists  that  simplicity  is   incompatible  with  any  
sort   of   ontological   multiplicity.   I   will   first   consider   why   he   thinks   understanding  
something  else  is  incompatible  with  being  the  ultimate  principle  and  then  turn  to  the  
case  of  self-­‐‑understanding.  
Let   us   start   with   the   easy   case:   where   the   object   I   am   understanding   is  
something   other   than  myself.   Here   the   object   seems   to   have   both   ontological   and  
explanatory  priority  over  my  understanding  of  it.  First  of  all,  it  needs  to  be,  in  some  
way,   in   order   for   me   to   understand   it.  Noēsis,   for   Plotinus,   as   for   Aristotle,   is   an  
intellectual   achievement.  Noēsis   is   a   success   term:   you   cannot   be   properly   said   to  
understand  something  that  is  incoherent  or  utterly  non-­‐‑existent.  I  cannot  understand  
phlogiston   if   there   is   nothing   there   to   understand.   Further,   these   ancient   thinkers  
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hold  that  any  ability  we  have  to  think  of  what-­‐‑is-­‐‑not  is  parasitic  on  our  contact  with  
and   thought  of  what   is.   I  may  be   able   to  picture   a  unicorn  and  even  give   a  verbal  
specification  of  it,  but  this  sort  of  mental  imagery  or  stipulative  definition  is  not  the  
comprehensive   grasp   of   a   form   and   its   real   definition   that   noēsis   requires.   For  
example,   some   suspected   the   initial   specimen   of   a   platypus,   shipped   back   from  
Australia,   of   being   a   fake   stitched   together   from   multiple   animals.   "ʺIt   naturally  
excites  the  idea  of  some  deceptive  preparation  by  artificial  means,"ʺ  English  zoologist  
George   Shaw   wrote   in   1799   (cited   in   Ohlheiser   2015).   Biologists   accepted   the  
platypus   as   an   appropriate   object   of   scientific   study   and   understanding   only   once  
they   conceded   that   such   creatures   actually   existed   as   unified   biological   entities.   In  
this  sense,   the  being  of   the  object  of  understanding  is  an  existential  precondition  to  
understanding.    
It   is   also   an   explanatory   precondition:   my   activity   of   understanding   is  
explained   by   the   object   I   am   understanding.  While   the   platypus   can   exist   and   be  
what   it   is   without   reference   to   biologists,   their   successful   understanding   of   the  
platypus   can  only  be  accounted   for  and  explained  by   reference   to   the  platypus.  So  
the   understanding   of   the   biologists   depends   on   the   platypus   in   two   ways.   Its  
existence  depends  on  the  existence  of  the  platypus  and  its  characteristics  (that  which  
accounts   and   explains   for   what   understanding   a   platypus   is)   also   depend   on   the  
form  of  platypus,  on  what  a  platypus  is.  
The  philosophers  who   think  nous  or   intellect   is   the  ultimate  principle   agree  
that   its   activity   cannot   be   directed   towards   something   beyond   itself,   for   reasons  
similar  to  Plotinus.  Instead,  from  Aristotle  onwards,   they  typically  conceive  of  nous  
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as   self-­‐‑understanding.   Plotinus   concedes   that   this   sort   of   life   and   activity   is   more  
unified  but  insists  it  is  still  multiple  in  a  problematic  way.  As  he  puts  it,  
There   is   a   difference   between   one   thing   understanding   another   and  
something   understanding   itself;   the   latter   goes   further   towards   escaping  
being  two…..if  it  has  what  it  understands  as  itself,  so  that  it  may  understand  
authentically,  the  two  will  be  one:  it  must  therefore  be  one  and  a  pair—but  if  
it   is,   on   the   other   hand,   one   and   not   two,   it   will   not   have   something   to  
understand:  so  that  it  will  not  be  understanding.  It  must,  then,  be  simple  and  
not  simple.  (V.6,  1.1-­‐‑2,  11-­‐‑14)  
  
Here  Plotinus   concedes   that   true  understanding   involves   oneness   between  knower  
and   known,   but   at   the   same   time   maintains   that   a   differentiation   and   separation  
between  subject  and  object  remains.    
Take,   for   example,   Socrates   understanding   himself.   This   activity   of  
understanding  seems  to  be  one,  insofar  as  Socrates  the  subject  and  Socrates  the  object  
are   the   same.   However,   for   Plotinus,   it   is   also   two.   In   achieving   understanding,  
Socrates  is  not  just  himself,  rather  he  becomes  understanding-­‐‑Socrates.  If  Socrates  as  
object   were   completely   identical   with   Socrates   as   subject,   there   would   be   nothing  
there  for  Socrates  to  understand.  Plotinus  conceives  of  understanding  as  discursive,  
as  unfolding   the  being  of   something.   In   seeking   to  understand  myself,   I   am  seeing  
myself  as  other,  as  object,  even  if  doing  this  is  what  allows  me  to  know  myself.    
As  Plotinus  puts  it,  
Knowledge  (gnōsis)  is  a  kind  of  longing  for  the  absent,  and  like  the  discovery  
made   by   a   seeker.   But   that   which   is   absolutely   different   remains   itself   by  
itself,  and  seeks  nothing  about  itself;  but  that  which  explicates  itself  must  be  
many.  (V.3,  10.49-­‐‑53)  
  
Plotinus  insists  that  the  turn  towards  understanding  necessarily  involves  a  distance  
and   otherness   between   the   subject   understanding   and   the   object   understood.   In  
pursuing  an  understanding  of  myself  I  am  seeking  for  something  I  do  not  yet  have,  
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longing   for   something   that   is   absent.  Even   if   this   activity  were   always   successfully  
being  completed,  so  that  I  am  never  actually  failing  to  know  myself,  there  would  still  
be  a  dependency  of  the  knowing  on  its  distinct  object.  
But  this  means  that  beings  that  understand  need  to  possess  a  sort  of  duality,  
they  need  to  be  able  to  be  both  subject  (as  understanding  themselves)  and  object  (as  
thing  understood).  Plotinus  holds  that  this  is  essential  to  understanding  as  such:  
It  is  necessary  for  what  understands  (to  nooun),  when  it  understands,  to  be  in  
two  parts,  and  either  one  must  be  external  to  the  other  or  both  must  be  in  the  
same,   and   the   act   of   understanding   (hē   noēsis)  must,   necessarily,   always   be  
both   in  otherness  and  in  sameness;  and  the  proper  objects  of  understanding  
(ta  kuriōs  nooumena)  must  be  the  same  and  other  in  relation  to  the  intellect  (ho  
nous).  (V.3,  10.24-­‐‑27)  
  
Intellect   needs   understanding   to   know   itself   because   it   contains  multitudes:   it   can  
only   be   what   it   is   by   its   everlasting,   non-­‐‑discursive   activity   of   understanding   the  
multiple  forms  that  constitute  it  and  constitute  being.  In  this  way,  it  is  dependent  on  
its  parts,   the  forms,   to  make  it  what   it   is   (even  if   they  are  also  dependent  on  it   in  a  
sense).  Both  give  each  other  their  status  as  being  what  they  are,  meaning  that  neither  
of  them  can  meet  Plato’s  Criterion.  It  is  one  thing  understanding  itself,  but  it  is  also  
many  insofar  as  it  contains  many  forms  with  relations  between  them.  This  manyness  
is  what,  for  Plotinus,  rules  out  ascribing  understanding  to  the  first  principle.  The  fact  
that   understanding’s   proper   objects   must   be   other   in   relation   to   the   subject   of  
understanding,   even   if   they   are   also   the   same,   means   that   understanding   cannot  
have   its   ontological   status   independent   of   anything   else.  On  my   reading,   although  
Intellect   is  never  actually   ‘seeking   for  something   [it  does]  not  yet  have,   longing   for  
something   that   is   absent,’   it  would  be   in   this   condition   if   it  were  not   everlastingly  
understanding  itself.  Because  an  absolutely  simple  being  lacks  the  required  duality,  
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we  cannot  attribute  understanding  to  it.  While  the  One  can  appear  to  the  Intellect  as  
a   pure   object   of   understanding   (V.6,   2.8-­‐‑9),   ‘in   itself   [the   One]   will,   in   the   proper  
sense,  be  neither  something  understanding  nor  something  understood.’  (V.6,  2.9-­‐‑10).  
As  Plotinus  insists,    
[The   One]   does   not   have   understanding   [noēsis],   because   there   is   no  
otherness;   and   it   does   not   change:   for   it   is   before   change   and   before  
understanding.   For   what   will   it   understand?   Itself?   Then   before   its  
understanding   it   will   be   ignorant   (agnoōn),   and   the   very   thing   that   is  
sufficient   for   itself  will   need  understanding   that   it  might   know   itself.   (VI.9,  
6.42-­‐‑46)  
  
Here  we  see  Plotinus  claiming  that  even  self-­‐‑understanding  involves  a  kind  of  lack.  
Plotinus’s  claim  here  is  not  about  temporal  priority  (since  he  thinks  that  the  Intellect,  
the  second  hypostasis,  is  eternally  understanding)  but  about  ontological  dependence  
and   explanatory   priority.   If   the   One   understood,   it   would   need   this   activity   of  
understanding   to   know   itself   and   to   avoid   being   ignorant   and   thus   would   be  
dependent   on   a   part,   on   an   activity   that   is   not   the   same   as   itself.   What   the  
understanding   thing   is   depends   on   the   understood   thing   and   this   means   that   it  
cannot  be  what  it  is  without  its  object.  Thus  even  a  perfect  self-­‐‑knower  would  fail  to  
meet  Plato’s  Criterion  or  1).  It  would  not  have  the  aseity  necessary  for  the  ultimate  
principle.  Again,   the  explanatory  priority  of   the  thing  understood  would  violate  2).  
Aseity  demands  utter  simplicity:  ‘For  knowing  is  one  thing;  but  that  [sc.  the  One]  is  
one   without   the   thing.’   (V.3,   12.51-­‐‑52) 4   Plotinus’s   objections   to   ultimate   self-­‐‑
understanding  help   to   elucidate  his   version  of  divine   simplicity.5  Plotinus’s   attacks  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  Plotinus’s  argumentation  in  these  passages  raises  a  number  of  further  questions  (e.g.  is  he  
fairly  representing  the  models  of  self-­‐‑understanding  put  forward  by  Aristotle?),  but  the  scope  of  this  
paper  does  not  allow  for  a  full  exploration  of  these  questions,  but  they  are  well  worth  considering.  5	  Plotinus’s  argumentation  in  these  passages  raises  a  number  of  further  
questions  (e.g.  is  he  fairly  representing  the  model  of  self-­‐‑understanding  put  forward  
Why  the  One  Cannot  Have  Parts            
  
30  
on  divine  activity  also  lay  out  the  difficulties  which  proponents  of  a  simple  but  active  
God  face.  
10. Conclusion  
Philosophers   and   theologians   have   several   alternatives   for   responding   to  
Plotinus.   There   are   two   options   for   those  who   concede   that   the   ultimate   principle  
must   be   absolutely   simple.   The   first   is   to   hold   that   this   strongly   constrains   our  
language  about  and  knowledge  of   the  divine,   requiring  us   to  avoid  positive  divine  
attributes   (e.g   Maimonides,   The   Guide   for   the   Perplexed,   chapter   50;   Ibn-­‐‑Sīnā  
[Avicenna]   2000).   Co-­‐‑religionist   opponents   of   this   approach   have,   however,   often  
suggested   that   this   sort   of   view   of   the   ultimate   being   is   not   faithful   to   the   divine  
being  presented  in  the  revealed  writings  (cf.  al-­‐‑Ghazali  2000).    
The  second  option  is  to  accept  the  strong  version  of  simplicity,  but  insist  that  
this  simplicity  is  compatible  with  the  sort  of  positive  predications  about  the  ultimate  
being   that   seem   to   be   found   in   the   scriptures   of   the   Abrahamic   religions.   God   is  
utterly  simple  but  can  truly  be  said  to  understand  and  to  love  and  to  freely  choose  to  
create.   The   challenge   for   this   second   option   is   to   show   how   (or   at   least   that)  
simplicity   and   various   divine   predications   are   compatible   and,   in   particular,   to  
develop   theories   of   predication,   such   as  Thomas  Aquinas’s   theory  of   analogy,   that  
allow   for   meaningful   positive   attributes   without   violating   strong   metaphysical  
simplicity   (Summa   Theologiae   Ia   q.13   a.1   ad   2;   cf.   Summa  Contra   Gentiles   I   30;   for   a  
contemporary  articulation  of   this   approach   see  Stump  2013).   Since   the  view   I  have  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
by  Aristotle?).  While  the  scope  of  this  paper  does  not  allow  for  a  full  exploration  of  
these  questions,  they  are  well  worth  considering.	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articulated  is  a  position  about  ontology—that  the  ultimate  being  is  simple  and  has  no  
metaphysical  parts—there  may  be  room  for  different  views  here.  
An   alternative   response   rejects   this   strong   version   of   simplicity,   while  
continuing   to   affirm   the   ontological   and   explanatory   priority   of   an   ultimate   being  
(e.g.  Plantinga  1980).  As  I  discussed  in  section  8,  proponents  of  this  position  face  the  
challenge   of   articulating   ontological   and   explanatory   principles   that   allow   for  
differentiation   within   the   ultimate   being   but   still   entail   that   the   cosmos   must   be  
dependent  on  something  outside  itself.    
Finally,  critics  may  simply  insist  that  Plotinus’s  views  constitute  a  reductio  ad  
absurdum.6  They  show  that  we  should  give  up  trying  to  find  an  ultimate  being  with  
absolute  explanatory  and  ontological  priority.  Even  these  critics,  however,  will  need  
to  say  either  why  they  entirely  reject  the  need  for  explanatory  and  ontological  prior  
entities  or  why  the  search  for  them  should  be  called  off  long  before  the  One.    
Thus  Plotinus’s  metaphysics  of   simplicity   is  well  worth   considering  both   in  
itself   and   as   a   way   to   clarify   general   issues   about   ontological   and   explanatory  
priority  that  face  all  accounts  of  reality.7  
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